DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 172 310 EA 011 260

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TITLE Behavioral Theories of Negotiations and Their Relation to Public Employee Bargaining.
PUB DATE [Aug 77]
NOTE 14p.; Paper presented at the National Conference of Professors of Educational Administration (31st, Eugene, Oregon, August 14-17, 1977)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Attitudes; *Collective Bargaining; *Government Employees; Motivation; Negotiation Agreements; Negotiation Impasses
IDENTIFIERS McKersie (R B); Trust; Walton (R E)

ABSTRACT

Recent research and theory on collective bargaining focuses on bargaining attitudes and behaviors. Walton and McKersie divided all bargaining into distributive and integrative. Distributive bargaining is competitive and based on an assumption of conflict of interest. Integrative bargaining is cooperative and based on the theory that power can be created rather than merely divided. They also defined intraorganizational bargaining as bargaining done within one bargaining group rather than across the table. This intergroup bargaining is usually done before actual collective negotiations begin. Walton and McKersie in their attitudinal structuring model identified four attitudinal dimensions to bargaining: motivational tendencies, beliefs about legitimacy of the other party, level of trust, and degree of friendliness. Herring found that those bargaining teams who come to closure most rapidly and with the least amount of negative feelings were those that consciously kept themselves on the task. Later researchers concentrated on the relationship between attitudes of the bargaining parties and bargaining impasse and agreement. From this research, it appears that there is a positive relationship between attitudinal structuring and the evolving behavior patterns in negotiations. The more positive the attitude, the greater the chance that the negotiations will evolve in an integrative fashion, even on those items that are by definition distributive. (Author/JM)

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BEHAVIORAL THEORIES OF NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR RELATION TO PUBLIC EMPLOYEE BARGAINING

by
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In this article an attempt will be made to discuss recent research and some educated hunches about bargaining theory, and the application of such theory to the evolving bargaining processes in the public sector. It is intended that a clearer understanding of theory when applied to the actual process will allow the parties to reach an acceptable settlement with less difficulty and with a more positive feeling about the process and each other, than they would otherwise have.

The basic structure of this discussion will follow the theoretical framework proposed by Walton and McKersie (1965)[1]. They referred to two major methods of reaching agreement as distributive and integrative bargaining. They further discuss two other types of bargaining behaviors, attitudinal structuring and intra-organizational bargaining.

To those unfamiliar with this framework the following brief description may be helpful.

Distributive bargaining has as its base a power relationship that can best be described as a "power pie". If one pictures the power available in a given bargaining relationship as a fixed amount, then what one side gains the other side loses and hence the loser has a smaller piece of the pie. This relationship has been described by other writers, Schelling (1960)[2] and Pruitt (1968)[3], for example, as pure bargaining. Distributive bargaining generally takes place when the parties are involved in discussions over the allocation of scarce resources. This bargaining relationship is viewed as competitive and there is a fundamental conflict of interest between the parties as to how the available resources should be allocated.

The behaviors evident in distributive bargaining are those that are geared toward inducing the "opponent" to adopt a lower settlement than they

might ordinarily be willing to accept. Pruitt (1968) describes the basic behavior as a highly "conflictual" experience in which one party uses its bargaining power to induce the other party into granting concessions. This pattern of bargaining relies heavily on the parties' bargaining power and their willingness and skill in the use of threats.

The parties' degree of bargaining power is affected primarily by the size of the unit, but also involved may be the quality of leadership, the character and makeup of the negotiations team, and its chief negotiator. Bargaining power enables a negotiator to grant rewards or coerce the opponent, and hold a position which enables him to wield his influence. Valentine (1971)[4].

Deutsch and Krause (1962)[5] define a threat as the expression of an intention to do something detrimental to the interests of another. Schelling (1960)[6] states that the motive behind a threat is to coerce, deter or constrain the other party's choice of action.

Distributive bargaining, then, is what is commonly known as the "horse trading" behavior of bargaining. If you picture in your mind the behavior exhibited by a successful vacuum cleaner salesman or the "closer" in an automobile sales organization you will have a good "feel" for the win-lose dichotomy associated with distributive bargaining.

On the other hand, integrative bargaining has as its base a power relationship that can best be described as additive power. Both parties can complete the bargaining relationship each with more power than they entered it. The basic given in this power relationship holds that power is not available in only a set amount—and what one gets the other loses,

as in distributive bargaining, but that an unlimited amount of power is available and creative, cooperative methods can be found to add power to both sides. The behaviors evident in this method are similar to joint decision making, or mutual accommodation. If the parties are at all inclined toward this method of operation they generally can operationalize it best with agenda items that contain possibilities for greater or lesser amounts of "value" which can be made available to both parties. This is especially true where the interests of both parties are identical, or at least coincidental.

These two types of bargaining, distributive and integrative, along with some combination of the two together, make up the basic behavior of all negotiations. The distributive model is often characterized by conflict and threat, the integrative model by cooperative joint decision making. A third bargaining model proposed by Walton and McKersie, intra-organizational bargaining, may, for strategic or other reasons, follow either the distributive model or the integrative one. The basic thrust of this special form of bargaining is not the behavior type, but the constituent group. In intra-organizational bargaining the focus of the action is within the group itself not across the bargaining table. Of most concern in intra-organizational bargaining is the necessary set of behaviors within a given bargaining team or its constituent group that allows for the development of a coherent and acceptable position, and allows for changes in that position as and if the bargaining process requires such change. For example, many bargaining teams are made up in part by special interest groups whose primary objective for being on the bargaining team is to protect their special interest. Coaches, guidance counselors, "top step" teachers and

others are often in this category. It may be necessary for much internal bargaining to ensue before the special interest groups will make necessary movement on their "pet" proposals. This also occurs in relation to the total constituent group. A school board, for example, may decide initially on a given set of parameters and then direct the management bargaining team to the negotiations table with those parameters. During the bargaining it becomes evident to the team that an agreement cannot be reached within the stated parameters. Then the team is required to report back to the constituent group to "bargain" for a new set of parameters that will allow for continued movement at the bargaining table or accept the position that no agreement may be forthcoming. Experienced negotiators will often testify that the intra-organizational bargaining that occurs in a given set of negotiations is often more difficult and involved than the across the table bargaining with the other side.

That gives a general overview of three of the four sets of behaviors described by Walton and McKersie. It is to the last of these--the attitudinal structuring model--that is the basic focus of this report. There are four attitudinal dimensions to the model. They are:

1) Motivational tendencies of the parties to each other--which can range from competitive to cooperative.
2) Beliefs about the legitimacy of the other parts--from denial of legitimacy to complete legitimacy.
3) The level of trust between the parties--from extreme distrust to extended trust.
4) The degree of friendliness between the parties--from hate at one extreme to completely friendly at the other.

Each of these four dimensions act, react and interact in the bargaining process to establish patterns of relationships (See Figure #1, next page.). These patterns of relationship have been the concern of recent research studies conducted under Dr. Harry Randles at Syracuse University. The results of these studies taken collectively begin to give some insights into the basic factors that affect closure in public employee bargaining. The underlying premise of this research is that there is a set of behaviors that students of Educational Administration can learn that will allow them to conduct their negotiations in a more productive manner, than if they did not learn them.

Herring (1969)[6] studied the effects of item difficulty, degree of organizational affiliation, and positive or negative bargaining behaviors (using Bales' schema) on the ability of the parties to come to closure. It was assumed that on those items perceived as less difficult to bargain the parties would be able to settle quite rapidly. This was found not to be the case. Clearly some other variables were the determiners.

It was further assumed that as the parties' degree of affiliation with the attitudes expressed by their constituent group became stronger, their ability to come to closure in negotiations would become less. That is, bargaining teams who held attitudes that were strongly labor or management oriented[7] (See Horvath 1967) when bargaining against each other would have more difficulty in coming to closure than those teams with lesser affiliation. This also did not prove to have a significant effect on the ability to come to closure.

Also investigated in this study were the amount of socio-emotional positive, and socio-emotional negative behaviors evident in the bargaining. It was hypothesized that a direct relationship would occur between positive

Attitudinal Structuring Components

Attitudinal Dimensions	Pattern of relationship				
	Conflict	Containment Aggression	Accommodation	Cooperation	Collusion
Motivational orientation and action tendencies toward other	Competitive tendencies to destroy or weaken		Individualistic policy of hands off	Cooperative tendencies to assist or preserve	
Beliefs about legitimacy of other	Denial of legitimacy	Grudging acknowledgment	Acceptance of status quo	Complete legitimacy	Not applicable
Level of trust in conducting affairs	Extreme distrust	Distrust	Limited trust	Extended trust	Trust based on mutual blackmail potential
Degree of friendliness	Hate	Antagonism	Neutralism Courteousness	Friendliness	Intimacy- "Sweetheart relationship"

from R. F. Walton and R. B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations. (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.: 1965)

socio-emotional behaviors and the ability to come to closure, and the opposite with socio-emotional negative behaviors. Once again, this area was not found to have significant bearing on the ability of the parties to come to closure. The one major finding of consequence in this study, as it related to closure, was a seemingly simple one. Those bargaining teams who come to closure most rapidly and with the least amount of negative feelings were those that consciously kept themselves on the task. They were not deterred by perceived item difficulty, their affiliation attitudes, or by either positive or negative behaviors. Those that stayed on the task completed it most rapidly. Further, the teams perceived themselves to have "gained" both power and an attractive settlement.

In addition to these findings this study introduced to the field of educational negotiations the behavioral theory model proposed by Walton and McKersie. Later researchers were to concentrate on the attitudes of the parties using the attitudinal structuring model.

Attitudes in bargaining have been discussed in depth by many writers. Deutsch (1971)[8], for example, points out that a mutually cooperative orientation between parties elicits highly predictable trusting and trustworthy behavior and honest communication. He goes on to state specifically:

1. There are two major types of conflict resolution processes: cooperative and competitive... one type or the other will usually predominate and will give rise to characteristic manifestations in communication, attitudes, perception, task orientation and outcomes... one way of eliciting a cooperative process is to attempt to induce the communication patterns, attitudes and so forth which help to support such a process.

2. ...the stronger and more salient the cooperative bonds are, the less likely it is that they will engage in a competitive process...Conflict is likely to be resolved cooperatively

> in situations where the parties have less at stake in a conflict than they have in the ongoing relationship between them or in the community which has generated rules and procedures for regulating conflict...(Deutsch, 1971, pp. 54-55).

Leberknight (1973)[9] studying impasse situations in Colorado found that the causal factors of impasse are primarily unique to each situation. He also found that the greatest single cause of impasse was probably the perceptual and attitudinal disagreement between the parties. He states that:

> ...both the association and the management group demonstrate very little objectivity in analyzing themselves, the other side, or the situation as a whole. Both show a degree of paranoia and closed vision. This attitudinal disagreement is probably the greatest obstacle to reaching reasonable agreements without impasse... (pp. 95-96).

LaMonica (1973)[10] using the relationship patterns in the attitudinal structuring model of Walton and McKersie, found that these attitude dimensions; motivational tendencies, trust, friendliness and legitimacy were significantly different in schools that had experienced impasse as opposed to those who had not. He further found that legitimacy area within the model had the least effect in the relationship. He speculated, however, that the beliefs about legitimacy may have the least effect because of the forced bargaining relationship that exists, i.e., since management was forced by law to bargain they questioned considerably the legitimacy of the other side to "demand" to bargain.

LaMonica further found that the time required to reach agreement tends to be shortened as the motivational tendencies approach the cooperative end of the conflict--cooperation continuum. And understandably, the money issues tend to be viewed as competitive regardless of the relationship pattern evolved by the group, but the intensity of the competition lessens as

the total relationship moves toward a cooperative pattern. This finding provides objective evidence to the theoretical posture described by Walton and McKersie in their discussion on distributive bargaining.

Another interesting finding described by LaMonica was the relationship between motivational tendencies and the level of trust. In nearly all cases where trust was high the motivational tendency was cooperative, and where trust was low the relationship was competitive.

Crandall (1976)[11] studying much the same basic question as LaMonica, found that districts who came to closure without outside intervention, i.e., mediation, factfinding, etc. indicated scores much more positive on a questionnaire designed specifically to measure the four components of the Walton and McKersie attitudinal structuring model. These districts were on the positive end of the trust scale, the friendliness scale, and exhibited a cooperative rather than competitive tendency in their bargaining.

Crandall further found that the most difficult of the attitudes to develop in the bargaining process are the attitudes that eventually lead the teams to the cooperative end of the spectrum.

From the work reported to date it appears that there is a positive relationship between attitudinal structuring and the evolving behavior patterns in negotiations. The more positive the attitude the greater the chance that the negotiations will evolve in an integrative fashion, even on those items that are by definition distributive. There is also some preliminary evidence (LaMonica, 1973)[12] that the behaviors and attitudes that develop during negotiations carry over into the daily operation of the school. Generally the relationship patterns fluctuate, sometimes more

positive at other times less positive. However, if the relationships are continually moved during the negotiation process toward the positive end of the scale this will result in a more positive relationship in the day-to-day operations of the district and will be reflected in the interaction of teachers and administrators.

FOOTNOTES

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